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More Statistics, Less Persuasion:
A Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions
Donald Braman*
and Dan M. Kahan†
ABSTRACT
What motivates individuals to support or oppose the legal regulation of guns?
What sorts of evidence or arguments are likely to promote a resolution of the gun
control debate? Using the survey methods associated with the cultural theory of risk,
we demonstrate that individuals’ positions on gun control derive from their cultural
world views: individuals of an egalitarian or solidaristic orientation tend to support
gun control, those of a hierarchical or individualist orientation to oppose it. Indeed,
cultural orientations so defined are stronger predictors of individuals’ positions than
is any other fact about them, including whether they are male or female, white or
black, Southerners or Easterners, urbanites or country dwellers, conservatives or lib-
erals. The role of culture in determining attitudes towards guns suggests that
econometric analyses of the effect of gun control on violent crime are unlikely to
have much impact. As they do when they are evaluating empirical evidence of en-
vironmental and other types of risks, individuals can be expected to credit or dismiss
empirical evidence on “gun control risks” depending on whether it coheres or con-
flicts with their cultural values. Rather than focus on quantifying the impact of gun
control laws on crime, then, academics and others who want to contribute to re-
solving the gun debate should dedicate themselves to constructing a new expressive
idiom that will allow citizens to debate the cultural issues that divide them in an
open and constructive way.
Few issues divide the American polity as dramatically as gun
control. Framed by assassinations, mass shootings, and violent
crime, the gun debate feeds on our deepest national anxieties. Pit-
ting women against men, blacks against whites, suburban against
rural, Northeast against South and West, Protestants against
Catholics and Jews, the gun question reinforces the most volatile
sources of factionalization in our political life. Pro- and anti-control
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forces spend millions of dollars to influence the votes of legislators
and the outcomes of popular elections. Yet we are no closer to
achieving consensus on the major issues today than we were ten,
thirty, or even eighty years ago.
Admirably, economists and other empirical social scientists
have dedicated themselves to freeing us from this state of perpetual
contestation. Shorn of its emotional trappings, the gun debate, they
reason, comes down to a straightforward question of fact: do more
guns make society less safe or more?1 Control supporters take the
position that the ready availability of guns diminishes public safety by
facilitating violent crimes and accidental shootings; opponents, that
such availability enhances public safety by enabling potential crime
victims to ward off violent predation. “[O]nly empirical research
can hope to resolve which of th[ese] . . . possible effects . . . domi-
nate[s].”2 Accordingly, social scientists have attacked the gun issue
with a variety of empirical methods ¾ from multivariate regression
models3 to contingent valuation studies4 to public-health risk factor
analyses.5
But evaluated in its own idiom, this prodigious investment of
intellectual capital has yielded only meager practical dividends. As
high-quality studies of the consequences of gun control accumulate
in number, gun control politics rage on with unabated intensity.
Indeed, in the 2000 election, their respective support for and oppo-
                                                
1 Compare Mark Duggan, More Guns, More Crime. J. Pol. Econ. (forthcoming 2001),
with John R. Lott Jr., More Guns, Less Crime: Understanding Crime and Gun Con-
trol Laws (2d ed. 2000).
2 Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue, Nondiscretionary Concealed Weapons Laws: A Case
Study of Statistics, Standards of Proof, and Public Policy, 1 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 436,
439 (1999).
3 See, e.g., id. at 452-56; Dan Black & Daniel Nagin, Do “Right to Carry” Laws Deter
Violent Crime?, 27 J. Legal Stud. 209 (1998); Duggan, supra note 1; Jens Ludwig,
Concealed-Gun-Carrying Laws and Violent Crime: Evidence from State Panel Data, 18
Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 239 (1998).
4 See, e.g., Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Gun Violence: The Real Costs (2000).
5 See, e.g., Arthur L Kellermann & et al., Gun Ownership as a Risk Factor for Homi-
cide in the Home, 329 New Eng. J. Med. 1084 (1993).
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sition to gun control may well have cost Democrats the White
House and Republicans control of the U.S. Senate.6
Maybe empirical social science has failed to quiet public dis-
agreement over gun control because empirical social scientists them-
selves haven’t yet reached consensus on what the consequences of
gun control really are. If so, then the right course for academics who
want to make a positive contribution to resolving the gun control
debate is to stay the course — to continue devoting their energy,
time, and creativity to the project of quantifying the impact of vari-
ous gun control measures.
But another possibility is that, in focusing on consequences
narrowly conceived, empirical social scientists just aren’t addressing
what members of the public really care about. Guns, historians and
sociologists tell us, are not just “weapons or pieces of sporting
equipment”; they are also symbols “positively or negatively associ-
ated with Daniel Boone, the Civil War, the elemental life styles of
the frontier, war in general, crime, masculinity in the abstract, ad-
venture, civic responsibility or irresponsibility, slavery or freedom.”7
It stands to reason, then, that how an individual feels about gun
control will depend a lot on the social meanings that she thinks
guns and gun control express and not just on the consequences she
believes they impose.8 As one southern Democratic Senator re-
cently put it, the gun debate is “about values” ¾ “about who you are
and who you aren’t.”9 Or in the even more pithy formulation of
another group of politically minded commentators, “It’s about the
Culture, Stupid!”10
                                                
6 See Jonathan Cowan & Jim Kessler, Changing the Gun Debate, Blueprint Magazine,
July 12, 2001.
7 William R. Tonso, Gun and Society: The Social and Existential Roots of the
American Attachment to Firearms 38 (1982).
8 See Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 413, 452-
59 (1999).
9 Zell Miller, The Democratic Party’s Southern Problem, N.Y. Times, June 4, 2001, at
A17.
10 Blueprint, July/Aug., 2001.
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This view, if correct, has important practical implications for
the gun debate. If individuals adopt one position or another because
of what guns mean rather than what guns do, then empirical data
are unlikely to have much effect on the gun debate. Instead of con-
tinuing to focus on the consequences of various types of regulation,
academics and others who want to help resolve the gun controversy
should dedicate themselves to identifying with as much precision as
possible the cultural visions that animate this dispute and to formu-
lating appropriate strategies for enabling those visions to be expres-
sively reconciled in law.
In this respect, we believe that the academic study of gun con-
trol stands to benefit from an alliance with the academic study of
risk regulation. Members of the public disagree strongly with experts
and with one another about the magnitude of various societal risks,
from environmental catastrophe to foreign invasion to economic
collapse. Through sophisticated survey instruments, anthropologists,
psychologists, and sociologists have documented the impact that
differences in moral attitudes and cultural orientations have in
shaping individuals’ perceptions of these kinds of risks. The result-
ing cultural theory of risk, moreover, has important implications for
what must be done ¾ and in particular, what must be said by citi-
zens to one another ¾ in order for such disputes to be definitively
settled.
Our goal in this article is to bring the tools of the cultural the-
ory of risk to bear on the gun control controversy. Part I furnishes
an overview of the cultural theory of risk. Part II applies the theory
to gun control. In addition to reviewing the fit between the cultural
theory and existing literature on public opinion toward guns, we
also present the results of an original empirical study that demon-
strates that attitudes toward gun control do in fact bear the relation-
ship to cultural orientations posited by that theory. Part III spells
out the implications of this finding for the kinds of arguments and
evidence that are likely to matter in the gun control debate. And
Part IV concludes with an exhortation to academics to apply them-
selves to the creation of a new expressive idiom, one designed to
accommodate respectful cultural deliberations over gun control.
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I. The Cultural Theory of Risk
Anthropologists, sociologists, and social psychologists have
long been interested in the puzzling diversity of risk evaluations.
Why might an individual act in an apparently risk-preferring man-
ner in one setting — say, by climbing mountains for recreation —
but in risk-averse manner — investing all of his retirement funds in
money-market certificates rather than in stocks — in another? Why
do different individuals attach radically different evaluations to dif-
ferent societal risks — of, say, a nuclear accident, a foreign war, or
the collapse of financial markets?
The answer — or at least one powerful answer — is the com-
plexity and diversity of social norms. Contrary to what rational
choice economics assumes, individuals don’t have generic attitudes
toward risky activities, but instead evaluate them according to con-
text-specific norms that determine what risk-taking connotes about
their values and attitudes. So a person may climb mountains on the
weekends to demonstrate (to herself and to others) that she pos-
sesses courage and physical discipline, and invest her retirement
funds in money-market certificates to demonstrate that she is pru-
dent, responsible, and forward-looking.11
Insofar as societies are often the sites of competing norms,
moreover, we should expect systematic variation in — and conse-
quently dispute over — public risk assessments. Acceptance of the
risks incident to nuclear power, for example, might signal confi-
dence in governmental and scientific authority, man’s mastery over
his environment, and the feasibility of unimpeded private com-
merce to one group of citizens, but collective hubris, disrespect for
the sacredness of nature, and generational selfishness to another.12
                                                
11 See generally Elke Weber, The Utility of Measuring and Modeling Perceived Risk , in
Choice, Decision, and Measurement 45 (A. A. J. Marley ed., 1997).
12 See generally Ellen Peters & Paul Slovic, The Role of Affect and Worldviews as
Orienting Dispositions in the Perception and Acceptance of Nuclear Power, 26 J. Applied
Soc. Psych. 1427 (1996).
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The cultural theory of risk, associated most famously with the
work of Mary Douglas and Adam Wildavsky,13 systematizes the re-
lationship between risk evaluation, social norms, and political con-
flict. That theory sees attitudes toward risk as derivative of social
norms. Irrespective of what they believe about the actuarial magni-
tudes of various risks, individuals routinely choose to run some and
avoid others because they believe it would be dishonorable or cow-
ardly or selfish or base to do otherwise.14 To the extent that indi-
viduals self-consciously rely on these norm-pervaded evaluations,
their attitudes toward risk can be said to be morally derivative of so-
cial norms.
But risk perception can be cognitively derivative of social norms
as well. The risks that we face in our daily lives are far too vast in
number and diverse in nature to be comprehended in their totality.
Of all the potential hazards that compete for our attention, the ones
most likely to penetrate our consciousness are the ones that com-
port with our norm-pervaded moral evaluations: it is easy to believe
that ignoble activities are also physically dangerous, and worthy
ones benign.15 Thus, “moral concern guides not just response to the
risk but the basic faculty of [risk] perception” as well.16
Because risk perceptions are derivative of social norms in these
senses, it would be a mistake, according to the cultural theory, to
see political controversy over risk as involving mere factual dis-
agreements. Individuals are primed by norms to perceive certain
risks and not others as worthy of public attention. When bestowed,
such attention necessarily reinforces the norms that make those
risks salient and denigrates the norms that would fix our attention
on some alternative schedule of dangers and threats. “We choose
[which] risks [to attend to] in the same package as we choose our
social institutions.”17 Thus, even when framed in narrowly factual
                                                
13 Mary Douglas & Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture (1982).
14 See id. at 73.
15 See id. at 72-73.
16 Mary Douglas, Risk Acceptability According to the Social Sciences 60 (1985).
17 Douglas & Wildavsky, supra note 13, at 9.
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terms, public disagreements over risks are in truth disputes between
citizens who subscribe to competing norms and to the conflicting
cultural visions that those norms construct.
The most ambitious version of the cultural theory reduces these
orientations to three.18 The hierarchical orientation favors deference
to traditional forms of social and political authority and is protective
of the roles and status claims that they entail. The egalitarian view,
in contrast, abhors social stratification, distrusts the social and po-
litical authority structures that rest on such differentiation, and fa-
vors collective action to equalize wealth, status, and power. The
individualist view prizes individual autonomy, celebrates free markets
and other institutionalized forms of private ordering, and resents
collective interference with the same.19
Each of these worldviews “has its own typical risk portfolio”
that “shuts out perception of some dangers and highlights others.”20
Thus, in line with their commitment to fair distribution of re-
sources, individuals of an egalitarian orientation are predictably sen-
sitive to environmental and industrial risks, the minimization of
which licenses the regulation of commercial activities productive of
disparities in wealth and status. In contrast, individualists, precisely
because they are dedicated to the autonomy of markets and other
private orderings, tend to see environmental risks from commerce as
low — as do hiearchists, in line with their confidence in the com-
petence of authorities to solve society’s problems. Hiearchists and
individualists have their own distinctive anxieties — of the dangers
of social deviance, the risks of foreign invasion, or the fragility of
economic institutions — which egalitarians predictably dismiss.21
                                                
18 See, e.g., Aaron Wildavsky, Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A
Cultural Theory of Preference Formation, 81 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1 (1987).
19 See id. at 6; see also Peters & Slovic, supra note 12; Aaron Wildavsky & Karl
Dake, Theories of Risk Perception: Who Fears What and Why? , 114 Daedalus 41, 44-
45 (1990).
20 Douglas & Wildavsky, supra note 13, at 8, 85.
21 See Wildavsky & Dake, supra note 19, at 44-54.
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The patterns of risk perception posited by the cultural theory
have been powerfully borne out by empirical testing. Using sophis-
ticated survey instruments, Karl Dake has shown that the degree to
which an individual’s cultural orientations tends toward hierarchi-
cal, egalitarian, or individualist worldviews does in fact strongly pre-
dict that person’s attitude toward a wide range of societal risks.22
Looking specifically at nuclear power and other technological and
environmental risks, Ellen Peters and Paul Slovic have reached
similar conclusions.23 Indeed, cultural orientations, these scholars
have shown, not only explain variance in risk perception, but ex-
plain it much more completely than do demographic characteristics
such as wealth, education, and political party affiliation.24 Other
personal characteristics that have been shown to explain risk per-
ception, such as personality type and affective responses to risk-
creating activities, also happen to correlate highly with cultural ori-
entations, and are thus plausibly seen as originating in them.25
To be sure, the cultural theory of risk does not solve all the
puzzles associated with the diversity of risk perception. But it in-
volves no exaggeration to say that the cultural theory of risk comes
closer to explaining what individuals fear and why than does any
other systematic account.
II. Guns, Culture, and Risk
The cultural theory of risk supplies an extremely powerful ex-
planation of political conflict over various types of societal risks.
Could it also explain the nature and intensity of the American gun
control debate? We now describe an empirical study designed to
answer that question.
                                                
22 See Karl Dake, Orienting Dispositions in the Perception of Risk: An Analysis of Con-
temporary Worldviews and Cultural Biases, 22 J. Cross-Cultural Psych. 61 (1991).
23 See Peters & Slovic, supra note 12.
24 See Wildavsky & Dake, supra note 21, at 51 (““Whether we look at knowledge,
personality, political orientation, or demographic variables, . . . we find that cultural
theory provides the best predictions of a broad range of perceived risk and an inter-
pretive framework in which these findings cohere.”).
25 See Dake, supra note 22, at 78; Peters & Slovic, supra note 12.
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A. Hypotheses
The gun control debate is naturally framed as one involving
competing perceptions of risk. Control advocates emphasize the risk
that insufficient regulation will make citizens vulnerable to deliber-
ate or accidental shootings, opponents the risk that excessive regu-
lation will leave citizens unable to defend themselves from violent
predation. The cultural theory of risk suggests that an individual
will select one or the other of these risks for attention depending on
how society’s response to that risk coheres with that individual’s
worldview.
Various forms of existing research on public opinion lend plau-
sibility to this view. The strongest predictors of attitudes towards
gun control — aside from gun ownership — are demographic.26
Whites are nearly 40% more likely than blacks; Protestants 33%
more likely than Catholics and nearly 200% more likely than Jews;
and men more than 100% more likely than women to oppose con-
trol.27 There are also significant regional and community-type varia-
tions: northeasterners are significantly more likely than southern
and westerners, and urban dwellers, significantly more likely than
country dwellers to support control.28 Insofar as group membership
                                                
26 See Gary Kleck, Crime, Culture Conflict and the Sources of Support for Gun Con-
trol, 39 Am. Behavioral Sci. 387, 390, 398 (1996); Tom W. Smith, 1999 National
Gun Policy Survey of the National Opinion Research Center: Research Findings 19-
20b (2000) [hereinafter “National Gun Policy Survey 1999”]; Tom W. Smith, 1996
National Gun Policy Survey of the National Opinion Research Center: Research
Findings 5 (1997) [hereinafter “National Gun Policy Survey 1996”]. Gun ownership,
while a strong predictor of attitudes towards gun control, is not a particularly useful
one. The most obvious reason is that it simply shifts the question from “why do peo-
ple support or oppose gun control?” to “why do people own or not own guns?”.
27 See General Social Survey, 1988-2000, cross-tabs.
28 See id. It might be thought that some these demographic labels are actually de-
scribing the same people — that those who live in rural areas are not only more
likely to support gun control, but are also more likely to be white than black and
Protestant than Jewish. But statistical models controlling for each of these demo-
graphic predictors have shown not only that that these demographic descriptors pre-
dict differing attitudes towards gun control, but that they do so independently of
one another. See Kleck, supra note 26. See also Part II.B. infra (describing results of
our regression analyses).
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influences the formation of a person’s values, the demographic clus-
tering of gun control attitudes is suggestive, if not conclusive proof,
of the impact of culture on gun-risk perceptions.29
The inference that culture is at work also gains support from
historical, ethnographic, and even journalistic accounts of the sig-
nificance of guns in American society. Their prominent (and in
many respects fabled30) role in American history has imbued guns
with a multiplicity of social meanings.31 Used to wrest national in-
dependence and to tame the western frontier, guns are thought to
resonate as symbols of “honor,” “courage,” “chivalry,” and “individ-
ual self-sufficiency.”32 These same associations also make gun pos-
session an evocative token of masculinity; the custom of awarding
of an adolescent boy his “first gun” has been characterized as “the
bar mitzvah of the rural WASP,”33 a “veritable rite[] of passage that
certifie[s] [his] arrival at manhood.”34 As the tools of the trade for
                                                
29 See Kleck, supra note 26.
30 See Michael A. Bellesiles, Arming America: The Origins of a National Gun Culture
(2001).
31 See Jan E. Dizard et al., Introduction: Guns Made Us Free ¾ Now What?, in Guns
in America: A Reader 1 (1999).
32 See, e.g., B. Bruce-Briggs, The Great American Gun War, Pub. Int., Fall 1976, at 61
(“[The gun culture’s] model is that of the independent frontiersman who takes care
of himself and his family with no interference from the state”); William R. Tonso,
Gun and Society: The Social and Existential Roots of the American Attachment to
Firearms (1982) (“ ‘Just to hold [a Colt Model ‘P’] in your hand produces a feeling of
kinship with our western heritage — an appreciation of things like courage and
honor and chivalry and the sanctity of a man’s world.’ ” (quoting gun collector));
Wright, Rossi & Daly, supra note 65, at 113 (“The values of th[e] [pro-gun] culture
are best typified as rural rather than urban: they emphasize independence, self-
sufficiency, mastery over nature, closeness to the land, and so on”). James D.
Wright, Ten Essential Observations on Guns in America, Society, Mar./Apr. 1995, at
68 (for control opponent, the gun “symbolizes manliness, self-sufficiency, and inde-
pendence, and its use is an affirmation of man’s relationship to nature and to his-
tory”). See generally See Richard Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation: The Myth of the Fron-
tier in Twentieth-Century America (1998) (examining historical evolution of pro-
gun meanings in American culture).
33 Bruce-Briggs, supra note 32, at 41.
34 Richard Hofstadter, America as a Gun Culture, 21 Am. Heritage 4, 82 (1970).
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both the military and the police, guns are also emblems of state
authority, increasing the appeal of owning them to individuals who
hold harshly condemnatory attitudes toward social non-conformists
and law-breakers.35
But inverting these meanings, other individuals find guns re-
pugnant. Just as they signify traditionally masculine virtues to some
citizens, so guns signify patriarchy and homophobia to others.36 While
some see the decision to own a gun as expressing an attitude of self-
reliance, others see it as expressing distrust of and indifference toward
others: “[e]very handgun owned in America is an implicit declara-
tion of war against one’s neighbor.”37 For those who fear guns, the
historical reference points are not the American Revolution or the
settling of the frontier, but the post-bellum period, in which the
privilege of owning guns in the South was reserved to whites, and
the 1960s, when gun-wielding assassins killed Medgar Evans, John
and Robert Kennedy, and Martin Luther King Jr.38 To these citi-
zens, guns are emblems not of legitimate state authority, but of ra-
cism and reaction.39
From the historical and ethnographic literature, one can infer
not only that the gun control controversy is culturally grounded,
but that the cultural fault lines that divide Americans on this issue
                                                
35 See generally Stinchcombe, supra note 59, at 106, 111-12; Wright, Rossi & Daly,
supra note 65, at 104, 112, 118.
36 See H. Taylor Buckner, Sex and Guns: Is Gun Control Male Control? (unpublished
manuscript, Aug. 5, 1994) (finding that aversion to “macho” style and tolerance of
homosexuality predict support for gun control); Lee Kennett & James La Verne
Anderson, The Gun in America: the Origins of a National Dilemma (1975) (noting
historical centrality of gun control to women’s movement); Wright, supra note 32, at
(for pro-control individuals, the gun “symbolizes violence, aggression, male domi-
nance”).
37 Don B. Kates Jr., Public Opinion: The Effects of Extremist Discourse on the Gun
Debate, in The Great American Gun Debate 109 (D. B. Kates Jr. and G. Kleck ed.,
1997) (quoting Gary Wills).
38 See Kennett & Anderson, supra note 36, at 223-25, 231.
39 See, e.g., Hofstadter, supra note at 221 (noting that the gun has historically been
“an important symbol of white male status”); Stinchcombe, supra note 59, at 113.
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overlap substantially with the ones featured in the cultural theory of
risk. The association of guns with traditional gender roles and with
state authority should make gun control anathema to individuals of
a relatively hierarchical orientation. Those of an egalitarian orienta-
tion, in contrast, should support gun control as a means of affirming
gender and racial equality. Persons of a relatively individualist orien-
tation should oppose gun control, which they are likely to see as
denigrating the ideal of individual self-reliance. By the same token,
individuals who are less inclined toward individualism should favor
gun control in order to express trust in, solidarity with, and collec-
tive responsibility for the well-being of, their fellow citizens. These
are the hypotheses that we decided to test.
B. Empirical Study Design
Our data source was the General Social Survey (GSS), 1988-
2000. Conducted by the National Opinion Research Center at the
University of Chicago since 1972, the GSS is the premier social sci-
ence survey of American public opinion.
Using appropriate questions from the survey, we constructed
two scales for measuring respondents’ cultural orientations.40 The
first scale, hierarchy-egalitarianism, measures the degree to which a
respondent is inclined toward either the hierarchical worldview or
the egalitarian worldview, which are naturally opposed to one an-
other. For this purpose, we selected GSS items focusing on attitudes
toward race, sexual orientation, the military, and capital punish-
ment.41 Individuals inclined toward an egalitarian worldview, we
                                                
40 These scales describe relative orientations, not discrete classes of people. In other
words, we are not saying that a person is necessarily a hiearchist or an egalitarian, an
individualist  or a solidarist. Indeed, it may be (and often is) the case that these norms
are competing not only within a society, but within individuals themselves as they
come into contact with social institutions that push them towards contradictory ap-
proaches. Also, we certainly don’t mean to suggest our scales provide a detailed un-
derstanding of cultural variation ¾ that requires good history and ethnography.
What our cultural orientation scales do provide, however, are heuristic measures
that enable reasonable comparisons of the influence of cultural values relative to
other characteristics, beliefs, and experiences on individuals’ attitudes toward gun
control.
41 The specific GSS items were as follows
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assumed, would express relatively strong opposition, those of a
hiearchist view relatively weak, to racial discrimination. We also
assumed that hiearchists, because of their dedication to conven-
tional gender roles and their abhorrence of social deviance, would
condemn homosexuality, while egalitarians, because of their opposi-
tion to social differentiation and their tolerance of deviance, would
not condemn it. Those of a hierarchical orientation, we posited,
should have a favorable view of the military, an institution which is
symbolic both of the state’s claim to authority and of conventional
gender roles. They should also support capital punishment, which is
symbolic of the state’s intolerance of social deviance.42 Those in-
clined toward egalitarianism should have a relatively negative view
of the military and oppose capital punishment for similar reasons.
The second scale, individualism-solidarism, measures the degree
to which a respondent is inclined toward an individualist worldview
or an opposing solidarist one. Although solidarism is not an orienta-
tion that figures in previous analyses based on the cultural theory of
risk, we believe such a worldview, which we define as the simple
negation of individualism, is implicit in the cultural-theory-of-risk
framework. Making it explicit in our model facilitates the analysis by
                                                                                                            
(1) Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder?
(2) Do you think there should be laws against marriages between (Ne-
groes/Blacks/African-Americans) and whites?
(3) What about sexual relations between two adults of the same sex—do you think it is
always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all?
(4) [do you agree with the statement] It is much better for everyone involved if the man is
the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family.
(5 and 6) We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved
easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like
you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or
about the right amount. Are we spending too much money, too little money, or about the
right amount on…
(5) Improving the conditions of Blacks;
(6) The military, armaments and defense.
42 See generally Barbara Ann Stolz, Congress and Capital Punishment: An Exercise in
Symbolic Politics, 5 L. & Pol. Q. 157 (1983).
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making our measure of the individualist orientation commensurate
with our measure of the hiearchist and egalitarian ones.
For this scale, we chose GSS items in which respondents were
asked whether they believed society should be spending more or less
on a variety of regulatory and social welfare programs. We surmised
that those of an individualist orientation, in line with their support
for the autonomy of markets and other private orderings, would fa-
vor spending less. In line with their dedication to collective respon-
sibility for the welfare of others, respondents of a solidarist orienta-
tion, we assumed, would favor spending more.43
We used a multivariate regression model to assess the influence
of cultural orientations, so measured, on attitudes toward gun con-
trol. Regression analysis is the standard technique used in the social
sciences to measure the causal or functional influence of one or
more events or conditions, which are styled “independent vari-
ables,” on another event or condition, which is styled the “depend-
ent variable.” Where one has reasonable theoretical grounds to be-
lieve that changes in the former (say, the arrest rate) affects the in-
cidence or level of the latter (say, the crime rate), the existence of a
                                                
43 The specific GSS items were as follows:
We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or
inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to
tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about
the right amount. Are we spending too much money, too little money, or about the right
amount on…
(1) Improving and protecting the environment;
(2) Improving and protecting the nation’s health;
(3) Solving the problems of the big cities;
(4) Halting the rising crime rate;
(5) Dealing with drug addiction;
(6) Improving the nation’s education system;
(7) Foreign aid;
(8) Welfare;
(9) Social Security;
(10) Mass Transportation; and
(11) Parks and recreation.
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statistically significant correlation between the two can be viewed
as confirming a causal relationship. Within a simple regression
model, such a correlation is expressed as a “coefficient” in an equa-
tion that relates changes in the independent varible to changes in
the dependent variable. Where a theory suggests that an event or
condition (again, crime) can be affected simultaneously by multiple
influences (not just arrest rate, but unemployment rate, and educa-
tion levels), multivariate regression analysis can be used to measure
the relative size of the coefficients associated with each independ-
ent variable, and hence to indicate the relative impact of each on
the dependent variable.44
The dependent variable in our model was the interviewees’ re-
sponse to a GSS gun-control question, which asks whether the re-
spondent would “favor or oppose a law which would require a per-
son to obtain a police permit before he or she could buy a gun?”
The independent variables included the hierarchy-egalitarianism
and individualism-solidarism scales, a variety of demographic and
political orientation measures used in previous analyses of public
opinion toward gun control, and respondents’ expressed fear of
crime.45 Our hypothesis about the relationship between cutlural
orientation and gun control attitudes predicted that the correlation
between our scales and support for gun control would be positive,
statistically significant, and large relative to the corelations between
the other independent variables and gun control attitudes.
                                                
44 See generally Larry D. Schoroeder, David L. Sjoquist & Paula E. Stephan, Under-
standing Regression Analysis: An Introductory Guide 11-28 (1986); Franklin M.
Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 702, 703-20 (1980).
45 Because of variation in items appearing in the GSS survey over time, we were not
able to generate complete data for every respondent in the sample. Missing data was
therefore imputed, using AMELIA: A Program for Missing Data by James Honaker,
Anne Joseph, Gary King, Kenneth Scheve, and Naunihal Singh (2001). In studies
like the present one, multiple imputation is considered superior to listwise deletion,
pairwise deletion, and mean substitution. See, generally, Gary King, James Honaker,
Anne Joseph, Kenneth Scheve, Analyzing Incomplete Political Science Data: An Al-
ternative Algorithm for Multiple Imputation, 95 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1, 49 (2001). Even
using these other methods, however, the cultural orientation scales exerted similar
explanatory power.
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C. Results and Discussion
We ran two separate regressions, the results of which are repo-
ted in Table 1. In the first, we regressed all the independent vari-
ables (which are listed in the first column of Table 1) except for our
cultural orientation scales against the dependent variable of support
for gun control. The standardized coefficients46 generated by this
analysis appear in the second column. In the second analysis, we
regressed all the independent variables, including our cultural orien-
tation scales, against support for gun control; the standardized coef-
ficients for this analysis appear in the third column of Table 1. This
approach allows us to observe not only how much cultural orienta-
tions matter relative to other variables, but also how much explana-
tory power is gained overall by adding cultural orientations to the
regression model. It also reveals how much of the explanatory
power conventionally associated with other variables is actually at-
tributable to systematic variations in cultural orientations across
different social groups.
                                                
46 Standardization allows the influence of independent variables — which corre-
spond to diverse characteristics that lack a common unit of measure in the real
world — to be made commensurable with each other. The standardization tech-
niques involves computing each variable’s coefficient in terms of how much a single
standard deviation of change in the indepdent variable affects the size of the de-
pendent variable. See Schoroeder, Sjoquist & Stephan supra note 44, at 31-32.
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without cultural
orientations
with cultural
orientations
Female 0.41***
(0.03)
0.39***
(0.03)
Black 0.06*
(0.03)
0.01
(0.03)
Northeast 0.07*
(0.03)
0.05
(0.03)
South -0.06*
(0.02)
-0.04
(0.03)
West -0.12***
(0.02)
-0.12***
(0.02)
Urban 0.06*
(0.02)
0.05
(0.03)
Catholic 0.15***
(0.03)
0.13***
(0.03)
Jewish 0.08**
(0.03)
0.06
(0.03)
Education 0.08**
(0.03)
0.03
(0.03)
Socio-Economic 0.09**
(0.03)
0.09**
(0.03)
Party Affiliation 0.17***
(0.03)
0.10***
(0.03)
Political Orientation 0.20***
(0.03)
0.11***
(0.03)
Fear of Crime 0.17***
(0.03)
0.18***
(0.03)
Hierarchy - Egalitarianism 0.14***
(0.03)
Individualism - Solidarism 0.33***
(0.03)
Constant 1.25**
(0.08)
1.26***
(0.08)
Cox & Snell R2 0.064 0.080
Observations 12378 12378
Note: To allow for comparison, betas have been standardized. Num-
bers in parentheses represent standard errors. * indicates p-value <
0.05; ** indicates p-value < 0.01; *** indicates p-value < 0.001.
Table 1. Logistic Regression of GSS Data
As Table 1 illustrates, the cultural orientation scales generated
statistically significant effects consistent with our predictions. That
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is, the more egalitarian and solidaristic an individual’s worldview,
the more likely that person was to support gun control; likewise, the
more hierarchical and individualistic the respondent’s worldview,
the more likely he or she was to oppose gun control. Indeed, among
individuals of divergent orientations, the contrast in attitudes to-
ward gun control was stark. Thus, individuals who were relatively
hierarchical in their outlooks were nearly twice as likely as those
who were relatively egalitarian, and individuals who were relatively
individualistic over four times as likely as individuals who were rela-
tively solidaristic, to oppose gun control.47
Even more impressive was the predictive power of cultural ori-
entation relative to other explanatory variables. Combined, the two
cultural orientation scales have a bigger impact on gun control atti-
tudes than does any other demographic variable. Indeed, with the
exception of gender, no other characteristic comes close to the ex-
planatory power of cultural orientations. Thus, cultural orientations
have an impact on gun control attitudes that is over three times
larger than being Catholic, over two times larger than fear of crime,
and nearly four times larger than residing in the West.
Whether one is hierarchical or egalitarian, individualistic or
solidaristic, also matters more than whether one is Republican or
Democrat, conservative or liberal. According to the regression
analysis, the cultural orientation variables, when combined, have
well over four times as large an impact on gun control attitudes as
does either party identity or political orientation. This finding is im-
portant because it demonstrates that cultural orientations are ulti-
mately not reducible to conventional political ideologies, which
have been found to be relatively weak predictors of gun control atti-
                                                
47 To estimate differences in opposition to gun control, all other variables were set to
their mean and opposition to gun control was predicted at moderately divergent
points of the two cultural orientations distributed along seven point scales. (This
would be similar to comparing moderate liberal and moderate conservative positions
on standard seven point scales measuring political views.) When this was done,
forty-four percent of individualists and twenty one percent of solidarists opposed gun
permit laws, while only nine percent of solidarists and twelve percent of egalitarians
opposed such laws. Of course, the divergence is more extreme among those who
hold more extreme views.
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tudes relative to other variables, including beliefs in the instrumen-
tal efficacy of gun control.48
Precisely because cultural orientations exert so much influence,
the demographic variables conventionally thought to predict gun
control attitudes exert considerably less in a model that takes cul-
tural orientations into account. Indeed, after cultural orientations
are controlled for, whether one is black, resides in the South, resides
in the Northeast, is a Jew, or lives in an urban area — five charac-
teristics otherwise very strongly correlated with attitudes toward gun
control — no longer have any significant effect.49 These results sug-
gest that the primary demographic divisions in gun control attitudes
are indeed artifacts of divergent cultural influences. They demon-
strate, too, that the hierarchy-egalitarianism and individualist-
solidarist constructs are strong representations of the cultural influ-
ences for which demographics are often used as proxies.
The aim of developing a regression model, of course, is not just
to assess the relative importance of various independent variables,
but also to account for as much of the variance in the dependent
variable as possible. In this respect, a model that includes cultural
orientations is clearly superior to one that does not. Overall, our
model explained 25% more of the variation in individual attitudes
toward gun control than was explained by a demographics-based
regression model that lacked measures of cultural orientation.50
These results, in sum, strongly support our hypotheses. As is
true for a wide variety of disputes involving risk regulation, differ-
ences in cultural orientations supply the most powerful explanation
                                                
48 See Tom R. Tyler & Paul J. Lavrakas, Support for Gun Control: the Influence of
Personal, Sociotropic, and Ideological Concerns, 13 J. Applied Social Psych. 392 (1983).
49 Education likewise loses any significance.
50 Conventionally, the overall power of a regression model is represented in the “R2”
term, which expresses the total fraction of the variance in the independent variable
explained by the independent variable. See See Schroeder, supra note 44, at 33;
Fisher, supra note 44 at 720. Including cultural orientation variables in our model
increased its R2 from .064 to .08.
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of why Americans disagree about whether and how to regulate
guns.51
D. Gender, Culture, and Guns
One thing that cultural orientations, at least as we have meas-
ured them, don’t explain also bears mentioning. That’s the impact
of gender on gun control attitudes. Cultural orientations clearly
matter within a gender. Hierarchic and individualistic men are more
likely to oppose control than egalitarian and solidaristic men, and
hierarchic and individualist women more likely to oppose control
than egalitarian and solidaristic women.52 However, as Table 1 re-
veals, the inclusion of cultural orientation measures in the regres-
sion model did very little to reduce the variation in attitudes across
genders. Whether one is hierarchical or egalitarian, individualist or
solidarist in one’s orientation, one is still substantially more likely to
favor gun control if one is a woman than if one is a man. Interest-
ingly, in this respect, our results are in accord with the results of
numerous other studies, all of which show that gender predicts risk
perception independently of cultural orientation and myriad other
influences.53
But while our analysis does nothing to dispel the gender and
risk mystery, we do think that our results deepen understanding of
                                                
51 We also ran a similar set of tests, and obtained similar results, using the National
Election Studies (NES) year 2000 survey data sets. Again, the cultural orientation
variables predicted gun control attitudes in line with our hypotheses and were statis-
tically significant. Again, the cultural orientation variables substantially increased
the overall explanatory power of the regression model ¾ this time by about 33%.
And again the cultural orientation variables had a larger impact on gun control atti-
tudes than did a variety of demographic variables, most of which were statistically
insignificant, presumably because of the relatively smaller size of the NES sample.
Indeed, although the overall fit of our model was stronger for the NES data (R2 =
0.213), we do not regard the analysis of the relatively small NES sample to be as il-
luminating as our analysis of the much larger GSS sample and therefore omit the
NES regression output (but are happy to supply it upon request).
52 When data from male and female respondents are disaggregated, cultural orien-
tations produce nearly as large an impact on the gun control attitudes of both.
53 See Peter Slovic, Trust, Emotion, Sex, Politics, and Science: Surveying the Risk-
Assessment Battlefield, 19 Risk Analysis 689 (2000).
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the precise character of it. It is commonly asserted that women are
more concerned with risk of all types ¾ environmental and social
¾ than are men. One suggested explanation for this finding is that
the prospect of accident, misfortune, or suffering is more salient for
women, either because they tend to have less political and physical
power than men and are thus more vulnerable in their daily lives, or
because they are predisposed by a combination of social and genetic
factors to be more empathetic.54
Our results complicate these assessments. In the case of the gun
control debate, the issue is not whether to accept a particular risk but
rather which of two risks ¾ that of firearm casualties in a world with
insufficient gun control, or that of personal defenselessness in a
world with excessive control ¾ we should find the least acceptable.
It is thus inaccurate to characterize women as “more concerned
with risk” in the gun-control setting; rather they are more con-
cerned with the risk that they will be victimized by a violent or
careless gun wielder, but less concerned with the risk that they will
be deprived of the power to repel a violent attack.
Similarly, it seems inadequate to attribute gender differences in
gun control attitudes to either a heightened sense of fear or a more
robust sense of empathy on the part of women. If the salience of
misfortune, accident, or suffering determines an individual’s position
on gun control, then women are more attuned than are men to the
prospect of being victimized by a violent or careless gun-toter, but
they are less attuned to the prospect of being deprived of a weapon
that one could have used to defend oneself from violence. Women
might experience greater vulnerability than men; but such vulner-
ability doesn’t by itself determine whether they should favor greater
efforts to disarm those who might prey on the weak or instead favor
the removal of restrictions that prevent the weak from arming
themselves with guns ¾ the “great equalizer” ¾ to compensate for
their lack of strength.55 Women, for social and biological reasons,
                                                
54 See id.
55 See Lott, supra note 1, at 20 (“Guns appear to be the great equalizer among the
sexes. . . . One additional woman carrying a concealed handgun reduces the mur-
der rate for women by about 3-4 times more than one additional man carrying a
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might be more caring then men; but for whom should they be ex-
pected to care more ¾ the individual who is shot by someone
whom the law might have disarmed, or the individual who might
have repelled an attack had the law not disarmed her?
On reflection, moreover, it seems that the characterization of
women as being more concerned with risk than are men is no more
cogent in other settings. As in the case of gun control, most disputes
over risk in fact pit one anxiety or fear against another.56 Nuclear
power opponents can be said to be more concerned than nuclear
power supporters are with the risk of environmental catastrophe. By
the same token, however, nuclear supporters can be said to be more
concerned with the risk of economic stagnation in the event of in-
adequate energy supplies ¾ a condition the brunt of which would
surely be borne disproportionately by weaker and more vulnerable
members of society. So in opposing nuclear power to a greater ex-
tent than do men, women are not displaying a greater aversion to
risk per se, but rather a greater aversion to one sort of risk and a
smaller aversion to another.
Our analysis, then, supports a recharacterization of the system-
atic differences in the attitudes of women and men toward risk.
Women’s concerns about risk are neither greater nor lesser than
men’s; they are just different. In all settings, some influence is mak-
ing one sort of risk more worthy of attention to women and another
more worthy of attention to men. We would surmise that that in-
fluence is cultural — as opposed to political or biological — given
the demonstrated power of opposing cultural orientations to focus
individuals’ attention on different sorts of threats and dangers. Nev-
ertheless, the precise difference in values that might explain why
women are concerned with some risks and men with others seems
                                                                                                            
concealed handgun reduces the murder rate for men. This occurs because allowing
a woman to defender herself with a concealed handgun produces a much larger
change in her ability to defend herself than the change created by providing a man
with a handgun.").
56 Indeed, this phenomenon is well known to risk-regulation experts. See generally
Risk Versus Risk: Tradeoffs in Protecting Health and the Environment (John D.
Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995).
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to evade the hierarchy-egalitarianism and individualism-solidarism
framework central to existing work on the cultural theory of risk.
Refining the cultural theory of risk to account for gender differences
thus remains a task for future study.
III. The Futility of Consequentialism
We have presented evidence that cultural orientations strongly
affect individual attitudes on gun control. This finding has impor-
tant implications for the gun control debate. Indeed, it suggests that
the dominant arguments in that debate are miscast.
Most participants in the gun control debate frame their posi-
tions in consequentialist terms. “Despite intense feelings on both
sides of the gun debate,” writes one prominent commentator, “eve-
ryone is at heart motivated by the same concerns: Will gun control
increase or decrease the number of lives lost?”57 Accordingly,
economists and social scientists have dedicated themselves to
amassing empirical data aimed at determining the net impact of gun
control laws on public safety. Politicians, too, ordinarily justify their
stances ¾ whether for or against gun control ¾ on instrumental
grounds, drawing liberally on the supportive social science studies.58
What must one assume about how individuals decide to sup-
port or oppose gun control in order for the widespread reliance on
empirical data to make sense? One possibility is that individuals be-
have like rational utility maximizers, weighing the expected benefit
of firearms as instruments of self-defense against the expected cost of
them as sources of lethal accident or (undesired) aggression. If this
were so, however, one would expect variation in violent crime ¾
                                                
57 Lott, supra note 1, at 21.
58 Compare 83rd Congressional District, Election ’94, Hartford Courant, Nov. 3, 1994,
at G23 (congressional candidate: “I support retention of the ban on assault weapons
and other gun-control measures as a cost-effective method of fighting violent
crime.”), with Dan Balz, Moving Slowly From Right to Center, Wash. Post, Apr. 25, 1999, at
A1 (“With many Americans alarmed by the proliferation of guns, Bush defended
his support for legislation in Texas that allows a person to carry a concealed weapon.
‘We live in a dangerous society,’ Bush said. ‘People feel like they need to defend
themselves.’ ”).
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and hence variation in the likelihood that guns will be used for
violent purposes ¾ to explain a substantial amount of the variation
in attitudes toward gun control. In fact, numerous studies ¾ in-
cluding ours ¾ have found that neither actual crime rates, per-
ceived crime rates, prior victimization, nor fear of victimization-
strongly correlates with public opinion toward gun control.59
In any case, the “rational weighing” hypothesis seems to beg
the most important question: what determines how much weight
individuals assign to any given piece of evidence on the conse-
quences of gun control? Whether permissive concealed hand-gun
laws promote or deter violent crime has been minutely investigated
and ferociously debated by economists and other social scientists.
Very few members of the public possess the technical training nec-
essary to evaluate the quality of the conflicting empirical studies for
themselves. So something independent of ¾ indeed, prior to ¾
their assessment of the data must be inclining individuals to accept
one empirical claim or the other in this debate.
Another view, founded in cognitive psychology, assumes that
individuals are, in effect, irrational weighers. Through a dynamic
known as the “availability heuristic,” individuals are thought to base
estimates of the probability of particular events (of, say, nuclear ac-
cident or groundwater contamination by toxic wastes) on the sali-
ence of particular instances of them ¾ a cognitive process that of-
ten leads to significant misestimations of the true probability of
those events.60 On this account, we should expect individuals to
believe that restrictions on guns increase or decrease public safety
based on how readily they can recall examples of firearms being
                                                
59 See Kenneth Adams, Guns and Gun Control, in Americans View Crime and Jus-
tice: A National Public Opinion Survey 123 (T. J. Flanagan and D. R. Longmire
eds., 1996); Gary Kleck, Crime, Culture Conflict and the Sources of Support for Gun
Control, 39 Am. Behavioral Sci. 387 (1996); Arthur L. Stinchcombe et al. Crime and
Punishment — Changing Attitudes in America 104 (1980). Our model, which looks
includes only fear of crime, finds that that factor has a significant but relatively small
effect on gun control attitudes. See Table 1 supra.
60 See generally Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk
Regulation, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 683 (1998).
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used to facilitate violent predation or instead being used to repel it
(or perhaps being unavailable for self-defense because of excessive
regulation).61
But this hypothesis, too, seems relatively weak. To begin, ex-
isting research suggests that dramatic and highly publicized in-
stances of gun violence, such as the Columbine High School massa-
cre, do not in fact affect public opinion on gun control.62 In addi-
tion, like the more straightforward “rational weighing” hypothesis,
the “availability” hypothesis begs an important question: why do
individuals more readily recall either offensive or defensive (or per-
haps thwarted defensive) uses of guns? Stories of both sorts
abound.63 Perhaps individuals who support gun control more read-
ily imagine instances of violent predation and those who oppose it
instances of heroic self-defense (or instances of self-defense tragically
                                                
61 See Paul H. Rubin, How Humans Make Political Decisions, 41 Jurimetrics J. 337,
350 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. Legal Stud.
1059, 1066-67 (2000).
62 See Smith, supra note 26, at 12.
63 Compare, e.g., Assailant Kills 3 Girls, His Bible-Study Teacher, St. Louis Post-
Dispatch, July 10, 1999, at 21; Peter Annin, “You Could See the Hate”, Newsweek,
October 28, 1991, at 35 (discussing Killeen massacre, “the worst shooting spree in
U.S. history”); with Art Golab, Senior’s Pals Hope He’s Taught Thieves A Lesson, Chi-
cago Sun-Times, December 10, 1998, at 8 (“The day after 81-year-old Bruno Kosin-
ski shot and wounded a man he said tried to rob him, neighbors in his Ukrainian
Village neighborhood hailed him as a hero.”); Scott Glover, Clerk Not Charged In
Robbers’ Shooting, Los Angeles Times, February 25, 1998, at B-3 (Jewelry store clerk
fatally shot two robbers during a botched Valentine’s Day heist; “The owners of the
jewelry store began keeping a .44-caliber handgun under the counter after a robbery
last year.”); Gun Control Kills Page of the Georgia Chapter of Women Against Gun
Control (multiple frustrated defense stories). Indeed, examples of both offensive and
defensive uses often appear in the same story. See, e.g., Kevin Sack, Southern Town
Stunned by Arrests in Murder Plot, New York Times, October 9, 1997, at A16 (A 16-
year-old student in Pearl, Miss. walked into the school’s commons and fired “round
after round from a hunting rifle.” An assistant principal “who was armed with his
own automatic handgun,” captured the student.); Jonathan D. Silver, Friends Ig-
nored Signs of Trouble from Teen, Arizona Republic, April 26, 1998, at A4 (Andrew
Wurst, a 14-year-old, opened fire on classmates at a banquet hall during his middle
school dance in Edinboro, Pa. The owner of the banquet hall, “who was carrying a
shotgun,” coaxed the teen into surrendering his pistol.).
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thwarted by gun control regulation) ¾ but something independent
of, and prior to, the stories themselves has to explain why one or
the other is more “available” to particular individuals.
In contrast to either of these views, the cultural theory of risk
posits that individuals’ assessments of empirical evidence will de-
pend on their cultural orientation. The norms that construct their
worldviews determine which risk ¾ that insufficient control of
concealed weapons will make citizens vulnerable to deliberate or
accidental shootings, or that excessive control will leave citizens
unable to defend themselves from attackers ¾ appears larger in size
or otherwise more worthy of amelioration by law.
The psychology of risk perception posited by the cultural the-
ory of risk explains how individuals weigh evidence of the conse-
quence of control. Confronted with competing factual claims and
supporting empirical data that they are not in a position to verify for
themselves, ordinary citizens naturally look to those whom they
trust to tell them what to believe about the consequences of gun
control laws. The people they trust, unsurprisingly,64 are the ones
who share their cultural outlooks, and who, as a result of those
outlooks, are more disposed to credit one sort of gun-control risk
than the other.
The cultural theory of risk also explains what makes instances
of offensive gun use more salient for some individuals and instances
of (successful or frustrated) defensive use more salient for others.
The cultural theory of risk posits that the norms that construct cul-
tural orientations operate as a mental filter, blocking apprehension
of some risks while letting others pass through. Accordingly, the
stories about guns that are most “available” to an individual are the
ones that are most congenial to his or her cultural commitments.
These conclusions rest on the thesis that perceptions of gun-
control risk, like perceptions of various others sorts of risk, are cog-
nitively derivative of social norms. The cultural theory also suggests
that attitudes toward risk are likely to be morally derivative. Thus, an
                                                
64 See Marilyn B. Brewer and Rupert J. Brown, Intergroup Relations, in t, 2 The
Handbook of Social Psychology 554 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al., eds., 4th ed. 1998).
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individual might worry more about being unable to defend himself if
society takes his gun away than he does about being shot if society
fails to disarm others (or vice versa) not simply because he rates one
risk as greater in magnitude than the other but because he sees ac-
ceptance of one or the other as demeaning or unjust.
This component of the cultural theory explains additional fea-
tures of public opinion that evade the “rational weigher” and
“availability” hypotheses. A substantial percentage of the persons
who say they favor gun control to reduce crime, for example, also
apparently accept the proposition that crime would not be reduced
substantially if the government enacted stricter gun control laws.65
Likewise, those who oppose gun control appear to be no more likely
than those who support it to believe that gun control interferes
with the use of firearms for lawful self-defense.66 These findings
make sense only if we assume that many individuals’ attitudes to-
ward gun control are not based solely on their beliefs about the im-
pact of gun control on public safety.
Indeed, when justifying their positions on gun control, indi-
viduals often acknowledge that their evaluations of gun risks are
moral and not merely instrumental in nature. Control supporters, for
example, argue that arming private citizens to deter crime would
endorse a vision of “society based on an internal . . . balance of ter-
ror,”67 “a jungle where each relies on himself for survival.”68 “[A]
world with slightly higher crime levels,” they assert, is a price worth
paying to avoid a world “in which we routinely wave guns at each
                                                
65 See Gary Kleck, Targeting Guns: Firearms and Their Control 339-40 (1997); see
also James D. Wright, Peter H. Rossi & Kathleen Daly, Under the Gun: Weapons,
Crime, and Violence in America 236 (1983) (number who believe gun control
would be effective in reducing crime is smaller than number who support gun con-
trol).
66 See Tom W. Smith, 1996 National Gun Policy Survey of the National Opinion
Research Center: Research Findings 8 & 33 tbl. 6 (1997).
67 H. Laurence Ross, Book Review, 98 Am. J. Sociology 661, 662 (1992).
68 Ramsey Clark, Crime in America 88 (1971).
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other.”69 Control opponents likewise express noninstrumental
evaluations of guns risks when they describe gun ownership as an
“individual right,” which presumably can’t be subordinated to col-
lective interests in public safety.70
Insofar as individual attitudes toward gun control fit the psy-
chological profile associated with the cultural theory of risk, there is
little prospect of consequentialist arguments resolving the gun de-
bate. Individuals will simply conform ¾ and if that’s not feasible,
subordinate ¾ their perceptions of what guns do to their culturally
grounded understandings of what guns mean. In this respect, em-
pirical gun-control studies will prove as inert as empirical death-
penalty studies, which individuals have been shown to credit or not
depending on whether such studies conform to the positions indi-
viduals hold on symbolic grounds.71
If consequentialist arguments can’t resolve the gun debate,
what kinds of arguments can? Again, those who study gun control
can learn from the experience of those who have studied other so-
cietal risks.
Experts have traditionally advocated basing risk regulation on
narrowly consequentialist measures of environmental and industrial
hazards. Techniques such as “cost benefit analysis” and “compara-
tive risk assessment” rank hazards according to a uniform expected-
utility metric. The policies they generate are defended as superior to
any based directly on public risk perceptions, the unruly character
of which is attributed to the public’s lack of information about the
                                                
69 Lindsay Boyer, Who Needs a Gun? (letter to editor), N.Y. Times, June 19, 1999, at
A14 col. 4.
70 See Robert J. Spitzer, The Politics of Gun Control 25-26, 49 (1995).
71 See Tom R. Tyler & Renee Weber, Support for the Death Penalty: Instrumental
Response to Crime, or Symbolic Attitude, 17 L. & Soc. Rev. 21 (1982); Phoebe C.
Ellsworth & Lee Ross, Public Opinion and Capital Punishment: A Close Examination of
the Views of Abolitionists and Retentionists, 29 Crime & Delinq. 116 (1983); Julian V.
Roberts & Loretta Stalans, Public Opinion, Crime, and Criminal Justice 239, 242-43
(1997).
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hazards posed by various technologies and to cognitive limitations
that distort layperson’s processing of such information.72
The inadequacy of this approach to risk regulation, however, is
well known and, by this point, largely accepted even by many ex-
perts.73 As the cultural theory of risk underscores, conflicting as-
sessments of environmental and technological hazards are not pri-
marily (or even largely) a consequence of imperfect information or
cognitive defects but rather a reflection of the diverse social mean-
ings that ordinary citizens attach to such dangers.74 Egalitarians,
solidarists, individualists, and hiearchists, then, aren’t really arguing
about what empirical data to trust; they are attempting to push cer-
tain risks to the center of the perceptual stage and to banish others
to the wings because risk regulation is pregnant with visions of the
good society.75 Expected utility analysis cannot tell us whose vision
— the egalitarian’s, the solidarist’s, the individualist’s, or the
hiearchist’s — is better. “Instead of being distracted by dubious cal-
culations,” then, we must attend openly to the question of what
“kind of society . . . we prefer to live in.”76
These same conclusions apply to the gun debate. Once the
contribution of cultural orientations is exposed, it becomes clear
that those involved in gun control debate aren’t really arguing
about whose perception of risk is more grounded in empirical real-
ity; they are arguing about what it would say about our shared val-
ues to credit one or the other sides’ fears in our law. For the indi-
vidualist and hiearchist opponents of gun control, it would be a
cowardly and dishonorable concession to our own physical weak-
                                                
72 For an influential statement of this view, see Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vi-
cious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation (1993).
73 See generally Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis,
and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 941 (1999); Slovic, supra note
53.
74 See Part I supra.
75 See Douglas & Wildavsky, supra note 13, at 81, 194-95; Wildavsky & Dake, supra
note 19, at 52.
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nesses for us to disarm all private citizens in the interest of public
safety. For the proponent of control, it would send an unacceptable
message of mutual distrust in each other’s intentions, of collective
indifference to each other’s welfare, and of the legitimacy of trad-
tional status differentiations to rely on each citizen’s decision to arm
himself as a means of keeping the civil peace. Just as it would be ob-
tuse to attempt to regulate environmental and technological risks
without regard to what accepting various risks means, so it is obtuse
to think that the competing risks associated with gun control can
be evaluated without taking account of what citizens think running
those risks conveys about society’s values. The only philosophically
cogent way to resolve the gun control controversy is to address ex-
plicitly, through democratic deliberations, the question of what
stance the law should take toward the competing cultural visions
that animate the gun control debate.
IV. A Pluralistic Expressive Idiom?
At least some participants in the gun control debate, of course,
do frame their appeals in explicitly cultural terms. These individuals
speak not in the technical, detached language of statistics, but in
the fiery, assaultive idiom of expressive condemnation.77 Control
partisans ridicule their adversaries as “hicksville cowboy[s],” mem-
bers of the “big belt buckle crowd”78 whose love of guns stems from
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their “macho Freudian hang ups,”79 while NRA President Charle-
ton Heston declares “cultural war” against “blue blooded elitists”
who threaten an “America . . . where you [can] . . . be white with-
out feeling guilty, [and] own a gun without shame.”80
Most citizens undoubtedly find this culturally chauvinistic style
of debate exceedingly unpleasant. Indeed, it is precisely the judg-
mental tone of expressive condemnation, we believe, that explains
the appeal of public safety arguments in the mainstream gun debate.
American political culture is heavily influenced by liberal dis-
course norms, which direct those engaged in public debates to dis-
claim reliance on contested visions of the good life and instead base
arguments on grounds acceptable to citizens of diverse moral out-
looks.81 Consequentialist modes of decisionmaking seem to satisfy
this standard. Furnishing apparently “objective procedures and cri-
teria” for policymaking, econometrics, cost-benefit analyses, contin-
gent valuation studies and the like are “decidedly divorced from
statements about morality.”82 Because they elide contestable judg-
ments of value, instrumental arguments are the “don’t ask, don’t
tell” solution to cultural disputes in the law — not just over gun
control, but over policies like the death penalty, hate crimes, wel-
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fare reform, environmental regulation, and a host of other contro-
versial policies.83
If this sort of indirection were an effective strategy for suppress-
ing attempts at cultural domination in law, it might be prudent to
assent to the continued centrality of public safety arguments in the
gun debate, notwithstanding — indeed, exactly because of — their
remoteness from the cultural cleavages that really divide Americans
on this issue. But the hope that the gun control debate can be made
less contentious by confining it to empirical arguments is in fact an
idle one.
As the cultural theory of risk itself illustrates, what individuals
accept as truth can’t be divorced from the values and practices that
define their cultural identities. Our knowledge of all manner of fact
— that men landed on the moon in 1969; that Andrew Wiles
solved Fermat’s Last Theorem; that the paternity of a baby can be
determined from a DNA test — derives not from first-hand observa-
tion but from what we are told by those whose authority we trust.
Whom we regard as worthy of such trust (religious leaders or scien-
tists at major research universities; Rush Limbaugh or the editors of
the New York Times) is governed by norms that we’ve been social-
ized to accept. For this reason, factual disagreement can be ripe with
political and cultural conflict. If you insist that I am wrong to be-
lieve that the Holocaust took place, or that God created the world,
you obviously aren’t reporting that your sensory experience differs
from mine; you are telling me that you reject the authority of institu-
tions and persons I am morally impelled to defer to. And for that
reason, I might well decide not merely that you are misinformed,
but that you are evil.84
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Because the facts that individuals accept about gun control
bear exactly this relationship with their cultural identities, there is
little reason to think that recourse to empirics can shield us from the
conflict generated by clashing worldviews. Indeed, it seems quite
obvious that it hasn’t. The mainstream empirical debate turns out
to be no less vituperative than the open cultural warfare being en-
gaged in at the fringes. While predictably failing to change anyone’s
mind, empirical analyses do reinforce the conviction of those who
already accept their conclusions that a rational and just assessment
of the facts must support their position. The disagreement is then no
longer seen as a reflection of differing visions of the good society,
but an ethical battle over acceptance of an indisputable, objective
truth. Instead of challenging one another’s worldviews, those who
continue the debate simply challenge one another’s honesty and
integrity.85
At the same time, consequentialism as a liberal discourse strat-
egy doesn’t even succeed in vanquishing open cultural conflict. On
the contrary, it tends only to deepen the acrimonious quality of it.
Most Americans are not cultural imperialists, but as the gun debate
starkly illustrates at least some are. For them, the liberal norm
against public moralizing lacks any constraining force. By speaking
in the muted tones of public safety in a (vain) effort to avoid giving
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offense, moderate commentators, politicians, and citizens cede the
rhetorical stage to these expressive zealots, who happily seize on the
gun debate as an opportunity to deride their cultural adversaries and
stigmatize them as deviants.86
In order to civilize the gun debate, then, moderate citizens —
the ones who are repulsed by cultural imperialism of all varieties —
must come out from behind the cover of consequentialism and talk
through their competing visions of the good life without embar-
rassment. They must, in the spirit of genuine democratic delibera-
tion, appeal to one another for understanding and seek policies that
accommodate their respective worldviews. An open debate about
the social meanings the law should express is not just the only philo-
sophically cogent way to resolve the gun debate; it is also the only
practical way to resolve it in terms that embody an appropriate dedi-
cation to political pluralism.
This conclusion presupposes that expressive debate in law can
be simultaneously pertinent and tolerant. The liberal anxiety that it
can’t be — that the only way to avert “the domination of one cul-
tural and moral ethos over all others”87 is to cleanse public discourse
of appeals to contested cultural views altogether — is far too pessi-
mistic. Anthropologists, sociologists, and comparative law scholars
have in fact cataloged many examples of communities successfully
negotiating culture-infused controversies — ones between archae-
ologists and Native Americans over the disposition of tribal arti-
facts;88 between secular French educators and Muslim parents over
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the donning of religious attire by Muslim school children;89 be-
tween the supporters and opponents of abortion rights in France
and Germany.90 Rather than hide behind culture-effacing modes of
discourse, the individuals involved in these disputes fashioned poli-
cies that were expressively rich enough to enable all parties to find
their cultural visions affirmed by the law.91
We don’t mean to understate the difficulty of adapting this
strategy of pluralistic expressive deliberations to the gun control is-
sue. Our society has grown so accustomed to the constraints that
liberalism places on political discourse that we seem to lack the vo-
cabulary and habits necessary for debating cultural issues in a con-
structive way.92 When the constraining force of liberal discourse
norms break down, as they inevitably do, we lapse into acrimony
and contempt.
This is the problem that scholars and others who want to make
a constructive contribution to the gun debate should dedicate
themselves to solving. The construction of a pertinent yet respectful
expressive idiom for debating guns is a task that will require at least
as much energy and creativity as has been invested so far in the
study of gun control’s consequences. Indeed, we imagine that an-
thropologists, sociologists, and philosophers will play a larger role in
this project than will economists.
The first step in such a project, of course, is to get as clear as we
can about the nature of the conflicting cultural views at stake in the
gun control debate. That has been the primary aim of the present
study.
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Conclusion
In this article, we have presented two claims and a plea. The
first claim was descriptive: that individuals’ attitudes toward gun
control are derivative of the type of social order they prize. Simply
put, individuals who are inclined toward egalitarian and solidaristic
worldviews are much more likely to support gun control than are
individuals who are inclined toward hierarchic and individualistic
worldviews.
Indeed, using the methods associated with the cultural theory
of risk, we have attempted to show that cultural orientations so de-
fined predict a person’s position on gun control more completely
than does any other fact about her. In this respect, individuals’ per-
ceptions of “gun risks” are of a piece with their perceptions of di-
verse other societal risks.
The second claim was normative: that those interested in re-
solving the gun debate should turn their attention away quantifying
the consequences of gun control. Because individuals’ positions are
derivative of their cultural orientations, consequentialist argument
can’t settle the dispute between those who favor control and those
who oppose it. The social norms that construct individuals’ cultural
worldviews act as a cognitive filter, causing them to credit certain
risks and supporting evidence and to dismiss others. As a result,
those who generate empirical data on gun control will always be
preaching to the choir.
Even more important, the norms that construct individuals’
cultural orientations invest collective responses to risks with social
meaning. Individuals of hierarchist and individualist orientations
oppose gun control because they believe it would be cowardly and
dishonorable — a gesture of individual impotence — for society to
disarm citizens for their own protection. Egalitarians and solidarists,
in contrast, support control because to them the anxiety that con-
trol will render individuals defenseless against predation connotes
distrust of and indifference toward their fellow citizens, the celebra-
tion of traditional gender roles, and racism. No amount of econo-
metrics or cost-benefit analysis can tell us how to respond to these
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risk appraisals; only a frank and open discussion of the competing
worldviews that sponsor them can.
Our plea is that scholars of gun control turn their attention to
the project of constructing a new expressive vocabulary for carrying
such deliberations forward. As the persistent and persistently vitu-
perative character of the gun debate demonstrates, the emergence
of a pertinent, civilized, and constructive discussion of the cultural
values that inform the gun debate cannot be taken for granted. Im-
poverished by the influence of liberalism, our political discourse just
doesn’t supply us with the resources we need for a productive and
tolerant discussion about our cultural differences. Currently, our
only options are silence — which is what the mainstream empirical
debate amounts to — and scorn.
Remedying this problem is the task that scholars and others
who want to settle the American gun question can most profitably
dedicate themselves to. We are not in a position to say what sort of
policies an open and honest engagement of these cultural differ-
ences will produce. But we feel certain that simply addressing the
gun issue in this way, rather than in the alternately duplicitous and
contemptuous way in which we now address it, would by itself en-
hance the quality of our democratic life.
